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REVIE~S

REVIEW ARTICLES
ANDENAES AND THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE*
LARRY I. PALMER**
For at least two reasons, American scholars
engaged in an expanding area of criminal law
related research cannot a.fford to ignore this
book by the noted Norwegian criminologist
and lawyer. First, Andenaes' pioneering work
was initially critical of the then predominant
theme in American criminology that treated
the issue of deterrence as one unworthy of serious intellectual consideration.1 Careful reading of his book will convince all but the diehard disbelievers that punishment and
deterrence must once again assume a central
role in scholarly discussion of the criminal
law. Second, perhaps because of increasing
skepticism of the efficacy of "treatment" as a
justification for the law's control over the individual among lawyers, jurists, and the public,
the time has arrived for the idea of deterrence,
and thus for Andenaes' book. Scholars must
now refine and address the problem of deterrence that has always been foremost in the public's mind in its view of the purposes of the
criminallaw.2
The major contribution of Andenaes' book, a
collection of essays written over the past
twenty years, is its coherent and analytical definition of deterrence. It is not surprising that
some of the essays as previously published
have already had substantial influence on criminal law-related scholarship.3 The book's infiu-

* A review article of PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE. By Johannes Andenaes. Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1974. Pp. vi, 189.
$9.00.
**Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers-Camden Law School.
1 }. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE
1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT].
2 As Andenaes points out, a large portion of the
public and public officials take the deterrence potential of the law very seriously.
3See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE

ence on public policy discussion may be dormant or emerge indirectly through the other
scholarship that has been and will be inspired
by its conceptual framework and research
questions. Legislators, jurists, police officers,
and sentencing and correctional officials are
now debating the law's ability to deter certain
conduct and the efficacy and legitimacy of punishment. It is hoped that those policy makers
will eventually have some notion of Andenaes'
concept of deterrence as an analytical starting
point of their discussions.
.On the assumption that various notions of
deterrence will have enduring influence on
public policy and scholarship, a reviewer has a
special obligation to make both explanatory
and critical judgments about such a complete
exposition on the subject as Andenaes' book.
That obligation will be fulfilled in two ways.
The analytical definition of deterrence, carefully developed in the series of essays, will be
described. As will be demonstrated, this definition is in fact an analytical perspective on the
purposes and justification of the criminal law.
Second, to demonstrate both the power and the
limits of his analytical framework, I will utilize the book's concepts to illuminate issues
often hidden in contemporary debates about the
criminal law. I will use the examples of the
debate over the efficacy of certain rules to
deter police from certain kinds of behavior and
the controversy over the "fairness" of Lieutenant William Calley's conviction, sentence, and
parole for his participation in the My Lai
Massacre during the war in Vietnam. This
examination of the limits of the analysis is in
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 370 (1968); F. ZIMRING
AND G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
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fact a tribute to Andenaes' intellectual powers
since the questions his analysis cannot answer
are enduring ones for those seriously engaged
in criminal law scholarship.
Andenaes writes for an audience, American
social scientists and academic lawyers, which
he assumes is either disinclined towards any
notion of deterrence or so oriented toward reform and rehabilitation that any notion of deterrence is almost foreign and certainly
archaic.4 The organization of the essays with
the three accompanying appendices is designed
to convince this skeptical audience of the
soundness of Andenaes' position that punishment and deterrence should be a primary justification for the criminal law. First, he bridges
the gap between his own perspective and that
of his audience by translating and explaining
the centinental term, "General Prevention,"
into the more familiar terminology for American readers, "General Deterrence." 5 Second,
he establishes the difference between special
and general deterrence in clear terms. He then
proceeds to demonstrate what claims can be
made for special and general deterrence. It is
the latter phenomenon that is Andenaes' primary concern in his first two essays.6
General deterrence is an inclusive term that
means for Andenaes the ability of "the criminal law and its enforcement to make citizens
law-abiding." 7 By use of this general concept
that is focused upon the behavior of the citizenry rather than solely on those small numbers who violate the law and are apprehended,
his concept of deterrence includes several distinct features. The general deterrence includes
not only psychological dimensions of the threat
or fear of punishment, but also the perceived
risk .of detection. In addition, the term includes
the ability of the law to strengthen other inhibitions by performing a moralizing and educa4 Since nearly all the essays appeared originally
in American journals over the years, Andenaes's
assumption about American academic audiences
may not hold today. As American audiences grow
more familiar with his work, his well-argued position for deterrence must become more analytical.
5 .ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT at 3-33, 173-74.
s .ANnENAES, PuNISHMENT, Chapter I, "General
Prevention-Illusion or Reality,'' 3-33; Chapter II,
"The General-Preventive Effects of Punishment."

34-83.
1

Id. at 7.
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tive function. 8 With such an all inclusive definition, the problem of general deterrence is not
merely one of empiricism9 for Andenaes, but
one of values10 and specification of conditions
imder which the law's general deterrence functions can be realized.
In any such attempted delineation of issues
the distinction between the various aspects of
the deterrent effect of the law and its effect
upon the individual offender-special or individual deterrence-must be made. Most of
American scholarship has focused generally on
the problem of deterrence.11 Once Andenaes is
convinced that his reluctant reader is persuaded of the necessity to be more precise in
any claims for or against general or specific
deterrence, he illustrates the utility of the distinction in his third essay entitled, "Deterrence
and Specific Offenses." 12 His fourth essay attempts to deal explicitly with the moral and
educative aspects of deterrence.18 While admittedly repetitious for readers already familiar
with Andenaes' work, the message is clear that
discussion of deterrence must become more
precise.14
Andenaes, of course, believes that we know
more about the general deterrence effect of the
criminal law from common sense reasoning
than most scholars have been willing to admit.
He is not, however, insensitive to the ethical
questions raised by the notion of general deterrence. The reluctance of scholars to give deterrence serious consideration in the past may
have been due to their discomfort with the noSJd.

ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT.
I d. at 77.
1 1 While Andenaes may be correct that criminologists are "treatment oriented," one group of
American social scientists, economists, are becoming aware of the law's deterrent potential. See, e.g.,
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law
Et~forcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 259 (1972).
12 ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT at 84-107.
18 ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT, Chapter IV, "The
Moral of Educative Influence of Criminal Law,"
9

10

11(}..28.
14 It is also possible that Andenaes' classification

of the various categories of offenses could be challenged. Id. at 86. I am particularly concerned with
whether his distinction between what he calls "police
regulations" and "economics crimes" hold law. This
review is not the place to attempt to consider when,
and under what circumstances Americans use legal
regulation rather than criminal sanctions, and how
the regulation and criminal sanction interact.
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tion of using one individual as a means of
keeping others law-abiding.15 He addresses this
ethical concern of scholars in his fifth essay,
"The Morality of Deterrence." 16 It is in this
essay that the reader is made acutely aware of
how the ethical issues differ for legislators and
sentencing officials.17 The legislator must consider the general deterrence effect in enacting
laws, but whether and under what conditions
the sentencing officials should consider general
deterrence is a more difficult ethical issue.18 It
is also in, thiS~ essay that the more careful
reader will have an inkling of Andenaes' more
generalized theory or perspective on the criminal law.19
The final essay is "The Future of the Criminal Law." 20 The only essay that has not been
previously published, it is essentially an exegesis of how central Andenaes thinks the concept of deterrence is to a host of problems in
criminal law. For instance, in deciding
whether there ought to be a move towards
shorter or longer sentences, his analysis, which
includes a critique of existing research, leads
towards shorter sentences. His suggestion here
ought to be given serious attention by researchers and policy makers. As with all good
analytical work, all his essays, particularly
those in the last appendix21 are sprinkled with
critical research questions which ought to be
refined and addressed by American scholars.
Until Americans become at least as critical
and precise as Andenaes in their use of the
concept of deterrence, our public and scholarly
debates will add very little to his pioneering
theoretical work. Judicial and scholarly debate
over the deterrent effect of the fourth amend1s I d. at 129.
1s I d. at 129-51.
17

IS

ld. at 135.
I d. at 135.

19 Readers familiar with the debates in American criminal law will find Andenaes' discussion of
risks of litigation inadequate. Id. at 78, 146. For
instance, Andenaes does not discuss how the lack
of review of sentence in most American jurisdictions creates a host of institutional problems. See
note 29 infra. But the inadequacy here is well compensated by the richness of his insights from the
Scandinavian experience.
,20 ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT at 152-72.
-21 I d. at 183-89. "The Relevance of Psychological Research for Deliverance Theory" has great
relevance to questions of the permissibility of
using scientific behavior control in prisons.
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ment's exclusionary rule22 is an excellent example of our present confusion about the concept of deterrence in general. Most participants
in this debate fail to include in their discussion
an explicit treatment of the issue of
"punishment" of police officers. 23 Assuming
that some aspect of visiting sanctions upon the
wrongdoer is involved in the rule of exclusion, few participants question why the sanction should in fact fall on the prosecutor rather
than the police. The jurists, as one would expect from Andenaes' analysis, are at least a bit
more aware that they are considering the
moralizing and educative function of the rule
of exclusion on police officers who are part of
the citizenry. 24 If it is the moralizing effect of
law that is in question, a better analysis involves the value conflicts that jurists must
make in deciding these cases, rather than on
whether we can measure the number of "illegal
searches" before and after the rule.2S Andenaes' concept of deterrence is broad enough to
2z See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Escltesio11ary
Rule it~ Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv.
665, 670-72 (1970).
23 The notion of condemning the police officer
seems to arise when the jurists debate whether
"good faith" or technical violations of the "illegal
search and seizure" doctrine ought to lead to exclusion in a given case.
24 Even an opponent of the exclusionary rule,
Chief Justice Burger, appears to recognize the educative influences of the judicial rule. He has
stated in the course of a critique of the rule:
I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be developed. In a sense
our legal system has become the captive of its
own creation. To overrule Weeks and Mapp,
even assuming the Court was now prepared to
take that step, could raise new problems. Obviously the public interest would be poorly
served if law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the impression, however erroneous, that all constitutional restraints on police had somewhere been removed-that an
open season on "criminals" had been declared.
I am concerned lest some such mistaken impression might be fostered by a fiat overruling
of the suppression doctrine cases. For years we
have relied upon it as the exclusive remedy for
unlawful official conduct; in a sense we are in
a situation akin to the narcotics addict whose
dependence on drugs precludes any drastic or
immediate withdrawal of the supposed prop,
regardless of how futile its continued use may
be.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1970)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
2s See note 22 suPra.
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be translated into an operational and conceptual framework for rethinking the issue of the
use of law to control state officials from impermissible, although not criminal, conduct. 26
Recent discussion of the "fairness" of infliction of sanctions on Lt. William Calley, especially among the "liberal minded and
educated" 27 miss Andenaes' analytical distinctions in talking about deterrence. Those who
claimed at one time that it was "unfair" to
punish Calley because other wrongdoers are
free, 26 failed to perceive that their opponents
spoke explicitly about the moralizing and educative effect of the criminallaw.2 9
With a clearer delineation of the issues, we
might have had more cogent debate over
whether the general deterrence effect can be
achieved through an adjudication of Calley's
crimes and a short sentence. In other words, is
the need for general deterrence met by a short
prison sentence in his case? While Andenaes'

work cannot answer that question, his analysis
would provide support for those ·seeking to
justify punishment in terms of retribution or
the need to deter Calley (special deterrence).
For criminologists, the book is probably the
modern statement on the problem of deterrence. For lawyers concerned with cases 30 and
legislation, the book must become a cornerstone in modern scholarship. For too long,
Americans have let notions of "individualization" of the criminal law mask the difficult
questions that general deterrence raises. 31
While the book is surely for scholars in terms
of its depth, it is certainly well written enough
for students in various disciplines, as well as
for the lay reader. Ordinarily, I would prefer
not to see things in print reprinted as books,
but this collection of essays is well worth the
effort of reprinting and adaptation since read
together the essays form a coherent book. My
only regret is that this is one of the few modern statements on deterrence. We desperately
need more theoretical as well as empirical
work in this area. For those already aware of
Andenaes' work, the book breaks no new
ground and adds no new theoretical insights.
For those unfamiliar with his work, the collection presents his position in a coherent fashion.

2s What is often implicit in Andenaes' book is
the idea that other types of legal schemes other
than criminal law ought to be examined in any
discussion of the deterrent effect of the criminal
law. See, e.g., ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT at 76, 125.
\¥hen dealing with deterring non-criminal conduct,
it is apparent that jurists do not think of deterrence in a mechanical fashion. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1970). At some point the
deterrent effect of mere regulation of such various
activities as drugs and alcohol ought to be critically
examined.
21 ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT at 133.
2s Marshall, We Must End the War, N.Y. Times,
April 10, 1971, at 23, col. 3.
29 Goldstein, The Meaning of Calley, 190 THE
NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 1971, at 13, 14.
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so Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(White, ]., concurring) (constitutionality of the

death penalty).
s1 See, generally, Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1972) ; Palmer, A
Model of Criminal Dispositiot~: An Alternative to
Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L.J. 1
(1973).
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